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I. Introduction
In November 1996, Californians will vote on Proposition 209, a
proposed amendment to the California Constitution known as the
* Pamela A. Lewis is a litigation and appellate attorney who practices in the San
Francisco Bay Area and is a member of the California State Bar Association; J.D., Santa
Clara University School of Law, 1983; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1977.
Lewis successfully represented Jack Bras, a white architect, in his Ninth Circuit appeal of
the district court's ruling that he lacked standing to pursue a constitutional challenge to the
California Public Utilities Commission's Women and Minority Business Enterprise Pro-
gram under its General Order 156, which required regulated utilities to implement Women
and Minority (Disabled Veteran) Business Enterprise ("WMDVBE") programs. Bras v.
California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800
(1996). The case subsequently settled when the California Public Utilities Commission
("PUC") agreed to pay Bras attorneys' fees and to propose revisions to its General Or-
der 156 to prohibit utilities from using set-asides and preferences, and from granting "pref-
erential treatment" to WMDVBEs in the administration of its programs. See PUC
Decision 96-04-018, issued on April 12, 1996, in Rulemaking Proceeding 93-09-026.
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California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI"). 1 The CCRI provides in
part that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferen-
tial treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employ-
ment, public education, or public contracting."2 The text of the CCRI
also contains additional subdivisions which limit the effect of the
amendment, including subdivision (c), which prevents the amendment
from invalidating bona fide qualifications based on sex that are pres-
ently permitted under state or federal law.3 Subdivision (c) of the
CCRI states: "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibit-
ing bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of public employment, public education,
1. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996).
2. Id. The full text of the CCRI is as follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I
Section 31 is added to Article I of the California Constitution as follows:
Sec. 31. (a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat-
ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnic-
ity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section's ef-
fective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide
qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court
order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective date of this
section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action
which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal
program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the
state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not neces-
sarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county,
public university system, including the University of California, commu-
nity college district, school district, special district, or any other political
subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the
same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin, as are otherwise available for violations of then-existing
California antidiscrimination law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this sec-
tion are found to be in conflict with federal law or the United States
Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent
that federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provi-
sion held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this
section.
Id.
3. See supra note 2.
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or public contracting."4 Opponents of the CCRI have seized upon the
language in subdivision (c) regarding bona fide sex qualifications, and
have argued that it will impact the judicial level of scrutiny applied
generally to sex classifications.5 That assertion is erroneous.
Subdivision (c) of the CCRI does not weaken the existing protec-
tions against sex discrimination provided by federal or state laws and
constitutions. The bona fide qualification language in subdivision (c)
is borrowed directly from the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; BFOQs are also
specifically recognized in California's own antidiscrimination laws.'
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that such qualifica-
tions constitute "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohi-
bition of discrimination on the basis of sex."'7 Subdivision (c) ensures
that some vital and extremely narrow sex qualifications-having to do
mainly with privacy interests-that are already permitted by existing
law are not inadvertently preempted by the CCRI.8
This Article explores how the opposition has created a mythical
"women's issue" in a purposeful attempt to instill fear in white mid-
dle-class women, the group the opposition considers the swing vote in
the upcoming general election. It also discusses how BFOQs are a
recognized and limited exception to antidiscrimination statutes. The
Article's purpose is to dispel the myth that subdivision (c) of the
CCRI impacts the level of judicial scrutiny afforded sex classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, Sex Discrimination Made Lega4"
Affirmative Action: The Proposed Civil Rights Initiative Would Loosen the Government
Standard, L.A. Tims, Jan. 10, 1996, at B9.
6. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994); Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West
1992 & Supp. 1996).
7. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
8. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 1996) (hospital
serving emotionally disturbed and sexually abused boys and girls could consider sex in
making shift assignments to ensure same-sex supervision of personal hygiene activities);
Hernandez v. University of St. Thomas, 793 F.Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992) (male custodian
who sought employment in women's dorm denied summary judgment because factual con-
siderations remained regarding bona fide occupational qualifications).
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H. Creation of a (Mythical) "Women's Issue" Is Meant to
Scare White Middle-Class Women, Who the
Opposition Considers to Be the Swing Vote
Groups who oppose the CCRI consider white middle-class wo-
men the swing vote in the election.9 Therefore, creating interest
among such women in opposing the CCRI is critical to the opposi-
tion's efforts to defeat it.10 It is not surprising then that CCRI oppo-
nents have tried to create fear about the CCRI's impact on women.
In particular, some opponents of the CCRI argue that the lan-
guage contained in subdivision (c) regarding bona fide sex qualifica-
tions will lessen the standard of review in gender discrimination cases
from strict scrutiny to rational basis." In support of their view, they
argue that the words "reasonably necessary"' 2 contained in subdivi-
sion (c) are meant to precipitate a lower "rational basis" standard of
review of sex classifications under the California Constitution. 3 That
is simply not true.
14
In fact, the words "reasonably necessary" in subdivision (c) have
nothing to do with the constitutional level of scrutiny afforded classifi-
cations based on sex. These words are contained in the very definition
of BFOQs, which are recognized exceptions to state and federal an-
tidiscrimination statutes. 5
9. See Jorge Aquino, East Bay Lawyer at Center of Affirmative Action Debate, RE-
CORDER, Mar. 29, 1996, at 1.
10. See Cathleen Decker, Bid to Fight Affirmative Action Ban Announced, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1996, at B1; Lawrence J. Siskind, California Civil Rights Initiative Isn't for
Men Only, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at A15; Stuart Taylor Jr., Affirmative Deception:
Supporters of Preferences Use Dishonest Arguments to Make Their Case, RECORDER, May
15, 1996, at 1; see also Amy Chance, Demo Anti-Initiative Drive Aimed at Women, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al. However, by some reports, opponents claim that subdi-
vision (c) lowers the standard of review from strict scrutiny, California's current standard
of judicial review of classifications based on sex, to the intermediate level of scrutiny ap-
plied under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution. See infra notes 11-13
and accompanying text.
11. See Aquino, supra note 9.
12. See supra note 2.
13. See Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5.
14. See Hokum vs. CCRI, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 25, 1996, at 4; Sally Pipes &
Eugene Volokh, Women Need Not Fear the Civil Rights Initiative; CCRI Its Language
Strengthens Rather Than Weakens Laws Against Sex Discrimination, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1996, at B9; The California Civil Rights Initiative... Will It Discriminate Against Women?
No-Clause C Won't Change the Laws That Already Prohibit It, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, July 14, 1996, at 6P; see also Linda Seebach, Affirmative Action Excess Led to Drive,
CJoRA COSTA TIMms (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Mar. 31, 1996, at B7.
15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter.., it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire ... on
1156
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Thus, the opposition has taken the words entirely out of context.
As will be shown below, BFOQs are recognized limited exceptions
and defenses to state and federal antidiscrimination laws.16 Moreover,
even such limited exceptions are still subject to judicial review on
equal protection principles.
17
The following examination of California and federal law inter-
preting BFOQs shows that despite use of the words "reasonably nec-
essary," stringent requirements must be met in order to sustain a bona
fide qualification based on sex, and that sex classifications reviewed
under the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution are
subject to strict scrutiny.'"
I. BFOQs Are a Recognized Limited Exception to State
and Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes and Provide Vital
Legal Safeguards for Both Men and Women
Bona fide occupational qualifications are a recognized limited ex-
ception to California and federal antidiscrimination statutes. 9 The
availability of a BFOQ defense has been described as "an extremely
narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex."20 Examples of BFOQs include qualifications concerning
shift scheduling to ensure same-sex supervision of personal hygiene
activities at a children's hospital,2 male-only certifications for chap-
lain positions at a California Youth Authority training facility, 2 and
male-only prison guards in "contact positions" in maximum security
the basis of... sex... where... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ... ").
16. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (explaining application
under Title VII); Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d
1 (1986) (explaining similar application under FEHA, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940, 12945
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996)).
17. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1 (1971) (finding no BFOQ and holding that
prohibition against females from tending bar except in limited situations violates Equal
Protection Clause of California and United States Constitutions).
18. I& at 16-18 (finding sex a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny); see also
Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1015-18 (1974) (stating that stringent
requirements that must be met to sustain BFOQ defense to sex discrimination claim often
lead to same results as does strict scrutiny of classification in Equal Protection analysis
under California Constitution).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940, 12945.
20. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d
517, 541 (1990) (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324).
21. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 1996).
22. Long, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 1000 (holding that personnel board's certification of
male-only chaplain position at youth training center operated by California Youth Author-
ity came within exception to sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)).
Summer 19961
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:1153
prisons where the possibility of physical injury to a female guard
would be particularly high.
23
Courts have often found that certain purported sex-based qualifi-
cations are not bona fide. For example, courts have disallowed
BFOQs in cases in which a fraternal organization claimed male-only
gender qualifications for employees because its members preferred
male employees;- 4 in which a woman was denied a cook's position at a
county sheriff's department; s in which only female liquor licensees,
wives, daughters, or sisters were permitted to tend bar;26 and in which
an airline hired only female flight attendants.2 7 Courts have also
struck down weight-lifting restrictions for women28 and exclusionary
job categories.29 "Fetal protection programs" have been invalidated
as not supported by any bona fide occupational qualification that
would allow classification of fertile women in employment.30
In fact, under existing caselaw, to find a valid BFOQ based on
sex, the court must find that the qualification is reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business and that "all or sub-
stantially all" members of that sex fail to satisfy the occupational qual-
ification. 31 In cases involving male-only qualifications, the employer
has the burden of proving that there is a reasonable cause to believe,
23. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-35 (holding that women may be excluded from work-
ing as prison guards in "contact positions" in maximum security prisons because of possi-
bility of attack by male inmates); see also County of Alameda v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 153 Cal. App. 3d 499 (1984) (citing Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d. 52, 54 (7th Cir.
1982)) (limiting BFOQs to circumstances where possibility of physical injury to female
applicant is high, and requiring governmental agency to make suitable accommodations
where privacy interests of those served by employees clash with applicant's right to obtain
job without sexual discrimination).
24. Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1986)
(reversing trial court's judgment which had set aside a Fair Employment and Housing
Commission order requiring club to cease its practice of refusing to consider women for
employment).
25. Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 506 (finding county's reasons for not hiring woman
as cook were pretextual and that gender-based classification was not BFOQ because secur-
ity would not have been disrupted by female cook).
26. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 14 (1971) (citing McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970)).
27. Diaz v. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971).
28. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
29. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d
517 (1990) (finding employer unable to sustain BFOQ defense to employment discrimina-
tion complaint by female applicant who was denied employment when she declined to
produce medical evidence of infertility).
31. See id. at 540.
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described as a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely and
efficiently.32 In addition, with respect to asserted qualifications based
on sex, the employer must prove that it is not possible to rearrange
job responsibilities to eliminate the need for a sex-based
qualification.33
The requirements for establishing a BFOQ under California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act3 are viewed as generally analo-
gous to the requirements articulated in federal precedent interpreting
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The California Code of Regulations
sets out specific situations in which the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission has determined that BFOQs are not justified. Factors
deemed as not justifying a BFOQ include:
(1) A correlation between individuals of one sex and physical
agility or strength;
(2) A correlation between individuals of one sex and height;
(3) Customer preference for employees of one sex;
(4) The necessity for providing separate facilities for one sex or
(5) The fact that members of one sex have traditionally been
hired to perform the particular type of job.36
Moreover, personal privacy considerations may provide justifica-
tion only where:
(1) The job requires an employee to observe other individuals
in a state of nudity or to conduct body searches, and
(2) It would be offensive to prevailing social standards to have
an individual of the opposite sex present, and
(3) It is detrimental to the mental or physical welfare of individ-
uals being observed or searched to have an individual of the op-
posite sex present.37
Therefore, although the words "reasonably necessary" are con-
tained within subdivision (c), much more than a "rational basis" re-
view is required to sustain such sex-based qualifications. Indeed, this
stringent standard regarding BFOQs often leads to the same results as
32. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 14 (1971) (citing Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235).
33. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1982); Johnson Con-
trois, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 541.
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1995); see Carr v. Barnabey's Hotel
Corp., 23 Cal. App. 4th 14 (1994) (using federal precedent in interpretation of FEHA
because FEHA deemed analogous to Title VII); Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20 (1986) (explaining requirements for establishment
of bona fide occupational qualifications).
36. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7290.8 (1990).
37. Id; Bohemian Club, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 20.
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the strict scrutiny standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause of the California Constitution.38
IV. The Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review for
Classifications Based on Sex Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the California Constitution Is Not Impacted
by Subdivision (c)
While the United States Constitution has been interpreted as re-
quiring intermediate review of classifications based on sex, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has interpreted the California Constitution as
requiring strict scrutiny of sex classifications. 39 Under the strict scru-
tiny standard applied to sex classifications under the California Con-
stitution, "the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it
has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinc-
tions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose."40 This
would remain unchanged by the CCRI because subdivision (c) ex-
pressly contains the qualification, "[n]othing in this section." If
adopted, the CCRI will become another section of the California Con-
stitution. The words "[n]othing in this section," contained in subdivi-
sion (c), will limit its effect to matters contained within the new
section-Article I, Section 31.41 Therefore, it will have no effect on
the level of constitutional scrutiny that courts apply to sex-based clas-
sifications under the Equal Protection provisions of the California
Constitution. Consequently, any purported BFOQs or sex classifica-
tions that are presently prohibited under the California Constitution
will remain prohibited or restricted after the adoption of the CCRI.
V. Conclusion
As shown above, the words "reasonably necessary" within subdi-
vision (c) do not relate to the level of judicial scrutiny applied to sex-
based classifications. Rather, the words are taken directly from the
definition of the BFOQ provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which qualifications are recognized in California's own antidiscrimina-
38. See Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1018 (1974); Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1 (1971).
39. Sail'er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d at 13, 15, 16-18 n.15; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (intermediate standard of review of sex classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution).
40. Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1008 (1974) (citing Sail'er Inn, 5
Cal. 3d at 16-18).
41. See supra note 2.
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tion laws. BFOQs are recognized exceptions to state and federal an-
tidiscrimination laws. Because the CCRI is an additional prohibition
on certain discrimination, it is important and appropriate to include
subdivision (c) to ensure that such necessary exceptions, already rec-
ognized in other antidiscrimination laws, are not inadvertently pre-
empted by subdivision (a) of the text. Most importantly, however,
because subdivision (c) relates only to the provisions of the CCRI-
"[n]othing in this section"-it has absolutely no impact on the strict
level of scrutiny applied to sex classifications under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the California Constitution.

